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Improvements in competitiveness can be achieved through policy initiatives, but the 
success of these policies will depend upon the way that firms and consumers respond. 
This paper establishes the conditions under which a policy change can lead to an 
improvement in the competitiveness of a Canadian firm. There are two firms (Canadian, 
U.S.) each with two brands and each making sales in two markets (Canada, U.S.) and two 
consumers, one in Canada and one in the U.S. Equilibrium is shown to depend on inverse 
compensated demand function coefficients, the conjectured best response coefficients for 
each firm and marginal cost functions for each firm. An improvement in competitiveness 
from an investment in public infrastructure in Canada is shown to depend upon initial 
sales ratios and the by sign and size of the best response of the Canadian firm as 
conjectured by the U.S. firm. It is also shown how the policy may have unintended 





La compétitivité peut être accentuée par le biais de politiques, mais le succès de ces 
politiques dépend des réactions des firmes et des consommateurs. Nous dérivons les 
conditions pour qu’un changement de politique puisse améliorer la compétitivité d’une 
firme canadienne. Nous supposons que deux firmes, une canadienne et une américaine, se 
concurrencent sur les marchés canadiens et américains en offrant des marques différentes 
de produits sur chaque marché.  L’équilibre dépend des fonctions inverses de demandes 
compensées, des conjectures entretenues par les firmes et des coûts marginaux des 
firmes.  L’amélioration de la compétitivité découlant d’un investissement public en 
infrastructure est influencée par le ratio initial des ventes de même que par le signe et la 
taille de la réaction de la firme canadienne telle qu’anticipée par la firme américaine. Il 
est aussi démontré que l’investissement public peut avoir des conséquences non-
attendues.  D’autres résultats peuvent être dérivés à partir du modèle qui se prêtes à 
diverses utilisations qui font l’objet d’une discussion.     Measuring Competitiveness in Twos
Sean A. Cahill
Research and Analysis Directorate
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada
January 2011
1 Introduction
Competitiveness has been the subject of much discussion, both in terms of
what it is and how to change it. In spite of its prominence in discussions
around the economy and economic growth, there is apparently is no gener-
ally accepted economic model of competitiveness. Economists have mostly
limited their attention to measurement, relying mostly on trade-based or
cost/eﬃciency/productivity indicators (Latruﬀe, 2010, pp. 5-6). One prob-
lem with these indicators is that they are not linked in any purposeful way
to economic theory.
The apparent absence of a well-developed theory of competitiveness hin-
ders the design of eﬀective policies and programs. If the nature and causes
of competitiveness are not well deﬁned, the social returns from public invest-
ments meant to improve competitiveness cannot be measured. This means
that the design of programs meant to improve competitiveness and decisions
about relative rates of funding for these programs must be made without
information on relative expected rates of return.
Competitiveness is often characterized as the ability of a ﬁrm to increase
sales in export markets. It is also frequently characterized as the ability of a
ﬁrm to increase sales in the domestic market. Both characterizations are usu-
ally expressed in terms of the ﬁrm increasing sales when facing competition
from other ﬁrms in either market. It is a given that a ﬁrm which exempli-
ﬁes competitiveness is one that also remains proﬁtable and/or becomes more
1proﬁtable over time. It is also a given that ﬁrms are rivalrous by virtue of
the word ‘competition’.
In spite of being at the top of government agendas for several decades,
competitiveness is still deﬁned in a myriad of ways and measurement of it
remains baﬄingly imprecise. As Latruﬀe observes, competitiveness “is ....a
broad concept and there is no agreement on how to deﬁne it nor how to
measure it precisely. There is a profusion of deﬁnitions with studies of-
ten adopting their own deﬁnition and choosing a speciﬁc method” (Latruﬀe,
2010, p. 5). The characterizations referred to above point to a need for an
analysis that can take all of these elements into account. In particular, such
an analysis must be able to address the fact that a ﬁrm will often be making
sales in both the domestic and foreign market and therefore that it needs to
be competitive in at least one of these two markets if it is to stay in business.
This means that it is necessary to be precise about the meaning of compet-
itiveness, with the cost of adding another deﬁnition to the mix. Here, since
the focus is on improvements in competitiveness, the deﬁnition is expressed
in terms of change rather than levels:
Deﬁnition of an improvement in competitiveness
For a ﬁrm, an improvement in competitiveness will be reﬂected by
consistent sales growth in any relevant market at a rate that is at
least as high as the sales growth of other ﬁrms (the competition)
in that market.
A relevant market is taken here to be one in which the ﬁrm is already making
sales. The analysis that follows could readily be extended to accommodate
entry into new markets.
Irrespective of the deﬁnition used, any analysis of competitiveness must
take the consumer into account. This aspect has typically been neglected,
with most of the focus being on the ﬁrm, the industry or the market, where
the latter is usually referred to in terms of size, rather than in terms of
the consumers that comprise it. This apparent neglect of the consumer is
surprising, given that consumers are ultimately the ones who determine the
degree to which a ﬁrm will be able to grow, either by overall growth in demand
2(of which it takes some share) or by substitution towards its product/brand
in favour of products/brands produced by other ﬁrms.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a model that can incorporate all of
these features and that can measure the impact of a range of policies designed
to improve competitiveness of Canadian ﬁrms. In many respects, the model
presented here has quite routine features and is similar to existing models.
It is a quantity-setting duopoly model, but with the two ﬁrms producing
two products (brands) and selling them in two markets (Canada and United
States) to two consumers, one in each market. There are at least two other
models in the literature that have similar features to the one developed here
— those of Bulow, Geanakopolos and Klemperer (1983) and Fung(1991). The
multimarket oligopoly model presented in Bulow et al. provides a much more
complete treatment of ﬁrm interactions but is more limited in terms of detail,
particularly with respect to the role of policy, where their policy analysis is
limited to subsidies. Fung’s model, while similar, focusses on the existence
and stability of various collusive arrangements. Neither model is directly
used to measure competitiveness, although either of them could easily be
oriented in that direction.
While ﬁrms in this model can, by deﬁnition, inﬂuence prices through their
quantity-setting strategies, this analysis is not concerned with market power
eﬀects that come about from oligopoly. There is a large literature dealing
with imperfect competition both with homogeneous and diﬀerentiated prod-
ucts — for food processing see for example Sexton and Lavoie(2001) or Wann
and Sexton(1992). This literature focusses primarily on markups and the
exertion of market power rather than the level of output and changes in it.
These studies are typically concerned with interactions in one market rather
than in two or more markets. There is similarly a large literature on trade
in diﬀerentiated products — for food processing in particular see Sarkar and
Surry(2006). Here, the ﬁrm usually plays no role at all — the focus is pri-
marily on the industry and the consumer, with diﬀerent industries in various
countries selling a commodity that is diﬀerentiated only by origin.
This model can generate a range of testable implications, following the
approach used in Panzar and Rose(1987), Bulow, Geanakopolos and Klem-
perer(1983) and Fung(1991), where a range of formal propositions point to
areas where quantiﬁcation might lead to further insights The potential range
3of testable implications is only touched on here — this is one of the areas that
will emerge from subsequent further research related to the various displace-
ments from equilibrium generated by hypothetical government programs.
2 Assumptions and Deﬁnitions
There are quite a few preliminaries that must be covered oﬀ before it is
possible to outline the model and derive results with it. The following lays
out the assumptions on structure, behaviour and rules as well as the notation
needed for implementation.
2.1 Notation
• There are two ﬁrms; one is the Canadian ﬁrm (‘C’) — the ﬁrst subscript
in the notation — where the ﬁrm can be thought of as a plant situated
in Canada.1 The second is the U.S. ﬁrm (‘U’) — the ﬁrst subscript in
the notation — where the ﬁrm can be thought of as a plant situated in
the United States
• There are two markets Canadian and U.S. (superscripts ‘c’ and ‘u’
respectively in the notation)
• There are two brands of a commodity produced by each ﬁrm and that
commodity is diﬀerentiated by origin where :
◦ yc
C and pc
C are production/sales and market price respectively for




C are production/sales and market price respectively for
the brand produced by the Canadian ﬁrm and sold in the U.S.
market
1Ownership of the plant (and permanence of it) is relevant to policy but not addressed
here. It is fair to say, though, that there are many possible types of ownership, such as:
(i) the plant is privately owned by an individual who resides in Canada; or (ii) the plant
is owned by a public company, shareholders of which all reside outside of Canada. The




U are production/sales and market price respectively for
the brand produced by the U.S. ﬁrm and sold in the U.S. market
◦ yc
U and pc
U are production/sales and market price respectively
brand produced by the U.S. ﬁrm and sold in the Canadian market
• There are two representative consumers (one in each market) with sub-
ututility zC for the Canadian consumer and zU for the U.S. consumer.
Other notation is introduced as needed.
2.2 Assumptions on Structure, Behaviour and Rules
2.2.1 Consumers
Consumers in the Canadian market substitute between the Canadian and
U.S. brands. They are indiﬀerent between the Canadian brand sold in the
Canadian market and the Canadian brand sold in the U.S. market (for ex-
ample because they diﬀer trivially, e.g. by packaging size or labelling). The
same is true for U.S. consumers — they are indiﬀerent between the two U.S.-
produced brands. Together, this means that cross-border purchases by con-
sumers are ruled out. The brands are suﬃciently diﬀerent, however, for the
Canadian ﬁrm to not sell its Canadian-marketed brand in the U.S. market,
i.e. the markets are segregated.
Demand is represented using inverse compensated demand functions,
which hold subutility ﬁxed. It is important that inverse demand functions
(rather than conventional demand functions) be used, because the eﬀect of
changes in quantity on price are determined through the demand side of the
model. The choice of compensated rather than uncompensated functions is
somewhat arbitrary, although from a policy analysis standpoint, it may be
desirable to look at policy alternatives that have a neutral eﬀect on consumer
welfare. Relative prices must adjust to match the quantity of the two brands
available on the market. It is assumed that the preference ordering of con-
sumers is known to both ﬁrms, for example from publicly available market
surveys.
5Canadian consumers have inverse compensated demand functions κc
C and
κc











Similarly, U.S. consumers have the inverse compensated demand functions
κu
C and κu











The inverse compensated demand functions have several properties — see
[5, p. 666] — which are stated here because it is possible to use them when
establishing some testable implications with the model:
• Homogeneity of degree zero in yc
C,yc












































for the inverse compensated demand functions facing the Canadian ﬁrm












































for the inverse compensated demand functions facing the U.S. ﬁrm in
the Canadian and U.S. markets respectively.
2Derivation of the inverse compensated demand functions is not required for this analy-







































































































respectively. A second necessary condition is that the determinants of


















respectively, since due to symmetry, the product of the oﬀ-diagonals
of EC and EU is always positive. Note that the latter condition, while
necessary, is not suﬃcient to ensure concavity, since it is possible for
the product of the diagonal elements to be less than the product of the
oﬀ-diagonal elements in each matrix.
2.2.2 Firms
The Canadian ﬁrm and U.S. ﬁrms are assumed to behave as quantity-setting
duopolists where each maximizes proﬁt by taking into account both the con-
sumer response as well as the response of the other ﬁrm. The problem is one
of ﬁnding the optimal quantity of sales for each brand in each market. As in
Bulow et al., the ﬁrm’s decision about how much to sell in each of the two
7markets is linked only through costs of production (Bulow, Geanakopolos
and Klemperer, 1983, p. 17). In this model, that link comes through ﬁxed
inputs and exogenous variables (some of which are set by policies) that are
shared in the production of each brand. Once each ﬁrm has solved for the
optimal level of sales it is possible to use the properties of the optimal solu-
tions and related demand responses to measure competitiveness and look at
how this changes when the exogenous policy variables change.
The assumptions regarding structure, behaviour and related ‘rules of the
game’ are now outlined:
• the Canadian ﬁrm produces yc
C and yu
C using the same technology —
where the two brands may involve diﬀerent combinations of inputs






where xC = [xC1,xC2,...,xCNC] is a 1 × NC vector of variable inputs ,
kC = [kC1,kC2,...,kCMC] is a 1 ×MC vector of inputs that are ﬁxed in
the short run and where at least some of those inputs are exogenous to
the ﬁrm and determined by Canadian government policy or programs
(e.g. public infrastructure). TC(kC) deﬁnes the production technology
— i.e. the feasible set of [yc
C,yu
C,xC] combinations, given kC — which
respects the conditions necessary for duality








where xU [xU1,xU2,...,xUNU]is a 1×NU vector of variable inputs, kU =
[kU1,kU2,...,xUMU] is a 1 × MU vector of inputs that are ﬁxed in the
short run — as with the Canadian ﬁrm, this will include some inputs that
are exogenous to the ﬁrm and that are determined by U.S. government
policy or programs — and TU(kU) deﬁnes the production technology,






combinations, given kU and which
also respects the conditions necessary for duality
• Fixed inputs for both ﬁrms do not have an eﬀect on interﬁrm rivalry,
i.e. ﬁxed inputs and changes in them are not used in a strategic manner
8• Both the Canadian and the U.S. ﬁrm take the response of the compe-
tition into account when making production/sales decisions — for ex-
ample, if the Canadian ﬁrm plans an increase in sales in the Canadian
market, it takes into account the change in sales that will be made by
the U.S. ﬁrm in the Canadian market. The same considerations apply
to the Canadian ﬁrm in the U.S. market and the U.S. ﬁrm in both
the Canadian and U.S. markets. This rivalry can be represented by
best response, or reaction, functions. The Canadian ﬁrm, which has
incomplete information about the U.S. ﬁrm’s technology, must make an
assumption about the U.S. ﬁrm’s best response to a change in the level
of sales of Canadian-produced brands. In particular, the Canadian ﬁrm

















The U.S. ﬁrm has similar conjectures about the Canadian ﬁrm’s best

















• Both ﬁrms are assumed to set their sales levels simultaneously, i.e.
there is no leader or follower
• Both ﬁrms operate at non-negative proﬁt. This rules out strategic be-
haviour where a ﬁrm deliberately incurs a loss; it also rules out random
events that lead to losses
• Inventories are not held — an increase in the amount of a brand avail-
able for sale in either market comes from shipments of the commodity
produced within the period under consideration — this means that the
terms ‘sales’ and ‘production’ can be used interchangeably.
93 Firm-level Optimization
3.1 The Canadian Firm
Optimization is based on a two-step procedure, which contrasts with a one-
step proﬁt maximization procedure. The two-step approach is characterized
in Jehle and Reny(1998, p. 237) as being, in the ﬁrst step, a calculation made
by the ﬁrm to determine the least cost of any possible level of production of
each brand. In the second step, the ﬁrm maximizes the diﬀerence between
the revenue from any given mix of brands and the cost of producing them.
This approach is common in the treatment of oligopoly in the industrial
organization literature — see, for example, Waterson(1984, p. 18).
The approach relies on the existence of a multiproduct cost function dual





















where wC is a 1×NC vector of input prices. The problem on the right-hand
side is to choose inputs xC to minimize the variable cost of producing a given
level and mix of production for brands yc
C and yu
C , given a particular level
of ﬁxed inputs kC. The set TC(kC) is restricted to ensure that, in the second
stage, all solutions are interior solutions. Roughly speaking, this means that
boundary points of TC(kC) are excluded.
Given the cost function (1), the associated proﬁt maximization problem,




















where, as before, yc
C and yu
C are nonzero. When prices pc
C and pu
C are replaced
by the respective inverse compensated demand functions and the Canadian
ﬁrm’s conjectures about the best response functions replace U.S. ﬁrm sales







































































C enters on the left-hand side
because it is value of the inverse demand function evaluated at the initial level
yc
C and exogenous level zC. The term in square brackets on the left-hand side
is the result of applying the chain rule - ﬁrst is the direct eﬀect of marginal
change on price pc
C, while the second is the indirect eﬀect on pc
C that takes
into account the conjectured best response of the U.S. ﬁrm to an increase in
sales by the Canadian ﬁrm in the Canadian market.

































C = 0 .
As it stands, the optimal levels of production/sales yc∗
C and yu∗
C can only
be derived implicitly from (4a) and (4b). Explicit solutions are needed for
the competitiveness analysis that follows, so it is necessary to have more spe-
ciﬁc forms for the inverse compensated demand functions, the best response
functions and the cost function. One way to achieve this (no doubt, there





in sales and to assume a more speciﬁc form for CC so that the production



























































U are coeﬃcients. These linear



































































U,C are coeﬃcients. These linear forms mean that





















To obtain a more speciﬁc form for CC, assume that the Canadian ﬁrm
produces its two brands using a nonjoint technology, where the deﬁnition of















C(wC,kC) is the marginal cost of producing the brand sold in Canada
and Cu
C(wC,kC) is the marginal cost of producing the brand sold in the
United States. Note that this form does not necessarily mean that there are
3The nonjoint technology means that the underlying technology speciﬁed earlier as
[yc
C,yu
C,xC] ∈ TC(kC) is replaced by a more speciﬁc form. For the non-joint technology










— see Hall(1973, p.884). Notice that there are no economies (or diseconomies) of scope
with this type of technology.
12distinct and physically separate processes used to produce the two brands.
This is reﬂected in part by the vector kC; no element of this vector is specif-
ically allocated to one brand or the other.
For each brand, marginal cost is independent of the level of production




















With these simplifying assumptions, it is now possible to express the op-
tima yc∗
C and yu∗
C in terms of the other variables and coeﬃcients. Substitution



















U,C and where, for this to be a ‘well-behaved’ supply
equation, ∂yc∗
C /∂pc
C > 0, meaning that Φc




U,C <    ξ
c
C,C
   , since by the concavity of the inverse compensated demand function,
ξ
c
C,C < 0. Since, by homogeneity, ξ
c
C,U > 0, a suﬃcient (and unnecessarily
restrictive) condition for Φc
C < 0 to hold is that ψ
c
U,C < 0.
Similarly, substitution of (6d), (8b) and elements of (5d) into (4b) and
rearrangement to isolate yu
C gives

















C = CC(wC,kC)(1 + α)
where α is some real number. For example, if α = 0.05, the marginal cost of the the brand

















U,C and, following the argument made above, it
must be that Φu





   ξ
u
C,C
   .
3.2 The U.S. Firm
For the U.S. ﬁrm, the problem is the same as that for the Canadian ﬁrm.
Nevertheless, for clarity, this is fully speciﬁed in a similar manner. In partic-






















where wU is a 1 × NU vector of input prices. The problem is the same as
that of the Canadian ﬁrm — choose inputs xU to minimize the variable cost
of producing a given level and mix of brands yc
U > 0 and yu
U > 0, given a
particular level of ﬁxed inputs kU.
Since it is clear from earlier discussion that the U.S. ﬁrm’s technology















U(wU,kU) is the marginal cost of producing the brand sold in Canada
and Cu
U(wU,kU) is the marginal cost of producing the brand sold in the
United States.






















which can be re-expressed as, using inverse compensated demand functions




































































where the ( ) notation is used in the same manner as for the Canadian ﬁrm
derivations





























U(wU,kU) = 0 .





to be linear in sales. In particular, the linear inverse compensated demand























































U are coeﬃcients. This means



































































C,U are coeﬃcients, so the best response elements




















Substitution of (16c) and elements of (15c) into (14a) and rearrangement


















C,U and where, for ∂yc∗
U /∂pc
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c
U,U
   , given that ξ
c
U,U < 0 by concavity.
Similarly, substitution of (16d) and elements of (15d) and (14b) rearrange-
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u
U,U
   .
163.3 Equilibrium
Note that the equilibrium price for each brand in each market is deter-
mined through the inverse compensated demand functions (5a),(5b),(15a)





U respectively. The model is thus comprised of two simultaneous equa-
tion systems. The ﬁrst system, which applies to the Canadian market, is
made up of equations (5a),(9a),(15a) and (17a). The second system, which
applies to the U.S. market, is comprised of equations (5b),(9b),(15b) and
(17b). The exogenous variables that are common to both systems are the
input price vectors wC,wU, the ﬁxed input vectors kC and kU and the ﬁxed
levels of subutility zC and zU.
Note that equilibrium requires that the Canadian ﬁrm’s conjectures about
the U.S. ﬁrm’s best responses and the U.S. ﬁrm’s conjectures about the















The solutions to the second system (U.S. market) is now derived — solu-
tions for the ﬁrst system (Canadian market) are identical, diﬀering only in
notation. The second system can be expressed in matrix form, with exoge-






















































where A is the 4×4 matrix of coeﬃcients, B is the 4×1 vector of endogenous
variables (sales by the Canadian ﬁrm of its U.S. brand in the U.S. market,
sales by the U.S. ﬁrm of its U.S. brand in the U.S. market, and prices of each
brand respectively) and C is the 4×1 vector of exogenous components. The
vector B can be solved for by calculating A−1 and deriving A−1C.The derived
expression A−1 is given in the Appendix. The expression for yu∗
C resulting

































































































































It will be assumed that this inequality applies (the necessary and/or suﬃcient
conditions under which this might hold could be worked out).
Notice that yu∗
C depends not only on all of the variables/coeﬃcients re-
lated to the Canadian ﬁrm and U.S. consumer, but also on all of the vari-
ables/coeﬃcients related to the U.S. ﬁrm. It is therefore important to take
this interdependence into account when looking at the impact of any policy
or program on the Canadian ﬁrm — there will be spillover to the U.S. ﬁrm
(see below) and changes that come about from its production/sales response.
The expression for yu∗































































184 Measuring an Improvement in Competitive-
ness
It is now possible to use the solutions derived above to examine the con-
ditions under which a policy change can generate an improvement in the
competitiveness of the Canadian ﬁrm. To begin, it is useful to reiterate the
deﬁnition of competitiveness stated in the Introduction, i.e. that
For a ﬁrm, an improvement in competitiveness will be reﬂected by
consistent sales growth in any relevant market at a rate that is at
least as high as the sales growth of other ﬁrms (the competition)
in that market.
This means that it is necessary to think of competitiveness in terms of diﬀer-
ences in optimal levels of sales between the two ﬁrms that arise from changes
in one or more exogenous variable for one or both ﬁrms. The model, how-
ever, is a static one and cannot accommodate growth in a direct way. It is
instead necessary to think of changes in variables that are exogenous to both
ﬁrms, and to look at how the optimal level of production/sales changes in
each case. These changes can be viewed as one-time increases or decreases
in sales where new levels are maintained until there is another change in one
or more exogenous variable.
Consider now an increase in the quantity of one of the ﬁxed inputs avail-
able to the Canadian ﬁrm. Suppose that, of the MC ﬁxed inputs, one is
the stock of public road infrastructure — let this be the element kC5 in the
vector kC. Now suppose that the stock increases, for example because the
Canadian government has funded the construction or improvement of a road
used by the Canadian ﬁrm. This will have a direct cost-reducing eﬀect for
the Canadian ﬁrm since allows the ﬁrm to decrease the level of one or more
inputs (such as fuel) even though it increases production/sales.
To look at the impact of this investment on the competitiveness of the












19where λC i = ∂Cu
C( )/∂wC i and µu
Cj = ∂Cu
C( )/∂kC j < 0∀j ;µu
Cj is the shadow
value of a ﬁxed input kC j, i.e. the reduction in the marginal cost of the U.S.
brand produced by the Canadian ﬁrm that arises from a marginal increase
in that ﬁxed input.5 Note that there will be an eﬀect µc
Cj = ∂Cc
C( )/∂kC j
for the Canadian brand as well, but that it will not necessarily be true that
µc
Cj = µu
Cj either due to kC j being exogenous to the ﬁrm, because it is not
possible to allocate a ﬁxed input across the production of brands in such a
way that these shadow values are equal.
If all other exogenous variables are held constant (i.e. all Canadian and
U.S. input prices, all ﬁxed inputs for the U.S. ﬁrm, the subutility levels for
































































U ) is reached with each ﬁrm using its conjecture about the other’s
best response function in order to determine the new optimal level of sales.
Also note that both dyu∗
C and dyu∗
U are positive, so the public investment in
Canadian infrastructure leads to an expansion in U.S. production and sales
by the U.S. ﬁrm, even though that ﬁrm does not actually use Canadian
5Note that λC idoes not give the ith input demand, since Shephard’s lemma only applies













This illustrates the fact that the actual input demands per brand cannot be determined,
only the total input demand for both brands, even though the technology is non-joint.
20roads.6 This could be interpreted of a positive spillover that the U.S. ﬁrm
receives as a result of the investment made by the Canadian government.
Then the ‘bottom line’ question is, to what extent will this new invest-
ment in infrastructure lead to an improvement in the competitiveness of the
Canadian ﬁrm? This will be reﬂected by an increase in sales for the Cana-
dian ﬁrm that is at least high as that of the U.S. ﬁrm. To determine the







































C denotes the change in competitiveness of the Canadian ﬁrm relative




















U and use the homogeneity property of the inverse com-







through the resulting inequality by ξ
u
U,C (which is always positive). These
changes give the following result:
∆
u






U − 1. (23b)





C,U, i.e. the ratio of Canadian to U.S. sales and the best response of the
Canadian ﬁrm as conjectured by the U.S. ﬁrm. This latter parameter reﬂects
the rivalrous aspect of the model — so long as the U.S. ﬁrm conjectures a best
response that falls below 2yu
C/yu
U − 1 and sets its level of sales accordingly,
there will be an improvement in competitiveness for the Canadian ﬁrm.
6One extension would be to allow certain ﬁxed inputs, such as infrastructure, to ap-
pear in both the Canadian and U.S. ﬁrms’s cost function. This would be appropriate if,
when the U.S. ships its brand for the Canadian market into Canada, it uses Canadian
infrastructure and vice versa. As things stand, the U.S. ﬁrm’s Canadian sales could be
thought of as occuring through a broker that arranges transport of the commodity from
the U.S. plant to the Canadian market.
21Figure 1 illustrates the set of values of ψ
u
C,U that corresponds to the
range yu
C/yu
U ∈ (0,1) for which (23b) will hold, i.e. in the range where both





C,U) pairs where improvements in competitiveness can occur. The
line is the set of threshold combinations, i.e. the maximum value of ψ
u
C,U for
each level of yu
C/yu
U where ∆u







outside of this set, competitiveness of the Canadian ﬁrm will
actually deteriorate. Thus, if for example, yu
C/yu
U = 0.4 (the Canadian ﬁrm
has sales that are 40% as high as the U.S. ﬁrm’s) and ψ
u
C,U = −0.1, the
investment in public infrastructure by the Canadian government will have
a unintended negative impact on the competitiveness of the Canadian ﬁrm.
This result is consistent for the most part with Bulow et al., who ﬁnd in their
two-ﬁrm/two- market/two-commodity model that a subsidy to one of the
ﬁrms in the ﬁrst market will increase the other ﬁrm’s activity in the second
market, hurting the ﬁrst ﬁrm in that market — see Bulow, Geanakopolos and
P.D. Klemperer (1983. p. 25).
Suppose that (23b) holds so that there is an improvement in competitive-
ness for the Canadian ﬁrm. Then the magnitude of that increase will depend
upon
• the degree to which the U.S. ﬁrm’s conjecture of the Canadian ﬁrm’s
best response (ψ
u
C,U) falls below 2yu
C/yu
U − 1. For any ratio yu
C/yu
U ∈
(0,1), this means that if ψ
u
C,U is less than the threshold value (this is
the boundary line in Figure 1) the improvement in competitiveness will
be higher than if it were equal to the threshold value. In other words,
the Canadian ﬁrm’s improvement in competitiveness will be larger to
the extent that the U.S. ﬁrm’s conjecture about the Canadian ﬁrms’s
best response is higher. This applies both in the range where threshold
value of the conjectured best response is negative — i.e. in the range
yu
C/yu
U ∈ (0,0.5) — and in the range of values where this is nonnegative
i.e. the range yu
C/yu
U ∈ [0.5,1). 7
7The former case, where the threshold value of ψ
u
C,U is negative, appears to be consis-
tent with the notion of strategic substitute, i.e. in this range, the best response by the
Canadian ﬁrm to an increase in yu
U (increase in sales by the U.S. ﬁrm in the U.S market)
is to decrease its own sales (decrease yu
C) so that the U.S. brand is substituted for the
Canadian brand.
The latter case, where the threshold value of ψ
u
C,U is nonnegative, appears to be con-
22• the size of µC5/(Φu
UΦu
C) < 0, the weighted shadow value related to the
marginal cost of of the brand sold on the U.S. market by the Cana-
dian ﬁrm. Note that the denominator is a composite comprised of:




C,U.from the U.S. consumer’s inverse compen-





U,C.from the U.S. consumer’s inverse compensated demand func-
tion for the U.S. brand; (iii) the Canadian ﬁrm’s conjecture about the
U.S. ﬁrm’s best response, ψ
u
U,C; and (iv) the U.S. ﬁrm’s conjecture
about the Canadian ﬁrm’s best response, ψ
u
C,U. The smaller the term
Φu
UΦu
C, the larger the eﬀect of the infrastructure investment on the
Canadian ﬁrm’s competitiveness.
• the size of the determinant |A| — the smaller this is, the larger will
be ∆u
C; since |A| is comprised of all of the relevant coeﬃcients from
the inverse compensated demand functions and the conjectured best
responses, its size will depend upon the relative magnitude of all of
these coeﬃents.
• the size of dkC5,the infrastructure investment made by the Canadian
government.
Taken together, these results show that, while an investment in Canadian
infrastructure will lead to an increase in sales of the brand the Canadian ﬁrm
produces for the U.S. market, this need not translate into an improvement
in competitiveness for the Canadian ﬁrm. If there is an improvement in
competitiveness, moreover, the size of this will depend on U.S. consumer
response and the conjectures made by both ﬁrms about their best responses.
5 Conclusion
The model developed here provides several insights regarding the nature of
competitiveness and the potential role for government policy in improving it.
The approach is simple: a two-market duopoly with a Canadian ﬁrm selling
two brands — one in the U.S. market and one in the Canadian market; the
U.S. ﬁrm also sells two brands, one in the U.S. market and one brand in
sistent with the notion of strategic complements where an increase in yu
U.is met by an
increase in yu
C — see Bulow, Geanakopolos and P.D. Klemperer (1983. pp. 2,8).
23the Canadian market. Consumers determine market prices by their demand
choices, which are modelled using compensated inverse demand functions.
The ﬁrm’s production costs are modelled using an assumed non-joint tech-
nology, which nevertheless retains the link that both ﬁrms have with the
two markets. By incorporating consumer demand and inter-ﬁrm rivalry, it
is possible to develop a large variety of testable hypotheses regarding the
conditions under which competitiveness will improve.
It is shown a cost-reducing investment in public infrastructure made by
the Canadian government may lead to an improvement in the competitiveness
of the Canadian ﬁrm, but that this is not certain — policy changes that on the
surface look like sure bets can actually lead to a deterioration in competitive-
ness. The eﬀect of the investment on the competitiveness of the Canadian
ﬁrm in the U.S. market is examined. An improvement in competitiveness
depends on two factors: relative production/sales prior to the policy change
and the U.S. ﬁrm’s conjecture about the best response of the Canadian ﬁrm
to an increase in its output. Where an improvement in competitiveness does
happen, its size depends on the relative magnitude of the coeﬃcients in the
U.S. consumer inverse demand functions and the conjectured best response
coeﬃcients of both ﬁrms.
Only the competitiveness of the Canadian ﬁrm in the U.S. market is exam-
ined. This follows from the tendency to think in terms of the competitiveness
of Canadian ﬁrms on world (export) markets rather than their competitive-
ness relative to foreign ﬁrms making sales on the Canadian market. Both
markets are relevant and the model can capture both eﬀects simultaneously.
It is conceivable that competitiveness increases in one market but not in
the other and the conditions under which this might occur have not been
explored.
It is also possible to measure the eﬀect of policy changes not only on
competitiveness but also on proﬁts. It is likely that, under certain conditions,
there could be an expansion in sales/production in both markets but a decline
in overall proﬁts, so examination of these conditions and the likelihood of
them would be useful.
The role of costs in competitiveness is important. Within the model,
changes in costs come about through changes in input prices or in levels of
ﬁxed inputs. While the latter aspect was investigated, the former was not.
24It would be useful to look at the impact of relative input price changes in
some detail.
It may be possible to estimate the model using ﬁrm-level or even industry-
level data, or at least generate some values for the various coeﬃcients. Even
if the model cannot be estimated, the results obtained here suggest that it is
still possible to develop a better understanding of the areas where policies can
have the most eﬀect. The model could also be useful in identifying the types
of data and other information that need to be collected to better understand
the potential impact of policies on the competitiveness of Canadian ﬁrms.
Bruce Phillips (RAD, AAFC) provided comments on an earlier draft and suggested
several improvements, for which I am grateful.
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